EROPA TIMUR DI TEPI JURANG KRISMON

Selama melancong di Singapore, kalau naik taxi, saya selalu bertanya kepada supir taxi mengenai dampak krisis moneter akhir-akhir ini terhadap penghasilannya. Sebabnya karena mall-mall dan jalan Orchard pada akhir pekan (Sabtu & Minggu) selalu penuh. Suntech, di Marina juga penuuuuuh sesak walaupun di hari-hari kerja. Banyaknya uuuu, itu sekedar ekspresi untuk menggambarkan betapa penuhnya. Jawabnya supir taxi yang saya tumpangi, ialah bagi dia penghasilan tidak berkurang. Argumennya, kalau ada potensi 100 pelanggan, maka yang bisa diambilnya hanya 20 orang saja. Jadi kalau turis berkurang 50% menjadi 50 orang, tidak akan ada pengaruhnya pada penghasilannya karena kesanggupannya hanya 20 orang.

Supir taksi berbeda dengan supir trailer, katanya lagi. Penghasilan mereka saat ini bisa berkurang 30%-50%. Eksport Singapura turun drastis, 30%-50%? Katanya lagi. Saya pikir mungkin hal yang sama terjadi di Indonesia, Cina, Malaysia dan Jepang; negara-negara yang ekonominya bersandar pada eksport. Walaupun krisis ini tidak menghantam banyak orang di negri-negri ini, tetapi, pemerintahnya terkena penurunan pendapatan pajak. Jadi jangan heran kalau pemerintah negri-negri ini akan mengalami defisit anggaran.

Krisis kadang kala tidak terasa bagi orang awam di negara eksportir. Seperti di Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia saat ini hidup masih berjalan seperti biasa. Itu bagi orang awam, tetapi lain lagi bagi para CEO dan eksekutif yang memonitor pendapatan perusahaan. Ada lagi jenis krisis lain seperti yang dialami Indonesia tahun 1997-1999 atau 1965 - 1968. Itu hampir semua lapisan masyarakat mengenyam rasanya.

Beberapa waktu lalu Ekonomi Orang Waras dan Investasi (EOWI) pernah mengangkat cerita mengenai Eropa Timur. Minggu lalu saya menjumpai ulasan dari RGE Monitor mengenai potensi krisis moneter di Eropa Timur. RGE menyamakan potensi krisis di Eropa Timur mirip dengan krisis Asia 1997.

Once an investor darling, Latvia’s booming, double-digit growth earlier this decade was accompanied by massive imbalances - a current-account deficit approaching 25% of GDP (among the world’s widest) and an external debt load that peaked at over 140% of GDP. The correction in these imbalances would have been challenging under any circumstances, but the global financial crisis and consequent drying up of capital inflows have raised the likelihood of a full-blown balance of payments crisis. Latvia’s currency, the Lat (LVL), is pegged to the euro within a ± 1% fluctuation band, and such pegs do not tend to survive harsh economic adjustments like that now underway. In countries with flexible exchange rates, domestic demand does not have to bear the full brunt of correction in external imbalances as currency depreciation can shoulder some of the burden.

Saya pikir kondisi Latvia jauh lebih buruk dari Indonesia tahun 1997. Defisit berjalan sebesar 25% GDP, hutang luar negrinya 140% GDP dan mata uangnya dipegged dengan Euro, adalah resep krismon yang manjur.

Latvia’s economy is currently on life support. Although agreement was reached in December on a € 7.5 billion (US$ 10.4 billion) IMF and EU-led rescue package, the government is now forecasting an 18% contraction in growth in 2009, making it one of the world’s fastest shrinking economies. The immediate focus is on whether Latvia will receive the € 1.7 billion (US$ 2.4 billion) installment of its loan package due in late June. The key stumbling block is Latvia’s ability to meet the 5% of GDP budget deficit limit laid out in the loan terms. The problem is not that Latvia’s government has been spending recklessly. Rather, the issue is that the drop-off in Latvian growth has been so precipitous, far beyond that envisioned when the loan agreement was signed just six months ago, that extreme fiscal belt-tightening is now required to meet the loan terms. A 5% GDP contraction was assumed in the original agreement, as compared to the 18% now forecast.

Toh seperti biasa, walaupun IMF mau kasih paket bantuan, tetapi persyaratannya banyak. IMF tetap ingin uangnya kembali. Yang disebut bantuan, bukanlah gratis. Oleh sebab itu andaikata bisa dapat paket bantuan IMF, Latvia tetap akan babak belur. Kemungkinan Latvia akan mengalami gelombang gagal bayar hutang luar negrinya dan devaluasi mata uangnya (ada yang mau nge-short?).

A key part of Latvia’s motivation in keeping its peg was its desire to adopt the euro early next decade. That euro adoption goal, however, increasingly looks like wishful thinking given the current economic woes. Some have argued that Latvia is clinging to its currency peg to avoid mass defaults, due to the high level of foreign currency-denominated lending there (around 90% of total loans).

Berbeda dengan US, hutang Latvia banyak didominasi oleh mata uang asing. Ini sangat berbahaya dan rentan terhadap devaluasi.

Tidak hanya Latvia, tetapi juga lainnya akan terkena effek domino.

Strong trade and financial linkages, not to mention similar macroeconomic vulnerabilities, mean a Latvian crisis would almost surely spread to Estonia and Lithuania's economies. Latvia’s fellow Baltics are its top trading partners. Meanwhile, the same Swedish banks that dominate Latvia’s banking system also dominate those in Estonia and Lithuania, providing another channel for contagion. Latvia is the weakest link of the three, having built up the largest imbalances. Nevertheless, the other two Baltics also experienced booming growth earlier this decade, along with double-digit current-account deficits, and all three are in the midst of severe recessions........

.......While Sweden is not looking at a full-blown crisis, its strong financial linkages with the Baltics could dramatically cut into the Nordic country’s growth prospects. Swedish banks have issued loans to Baltic borrowers equivalent to over 20% of Sweden’s GDP....

Bukan hanya bank-bank Swedia yang meminjamkan uangnya ke negara-negara Eropa Timur, tetapi juga bank-bank Swiss terutama ke sektor real estate Polandia dalam jumlah yang besar. Gagal bayar di Latvia akan menjadi alarm bagi bank-bank yang menjadi kreditur bagi bank-bank lain yang mempunyai eksposure di Eropa Timur.

Other countries in the region – Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia – also built up imbalances in recent years and are in the midst of their own sharp slowdowns. Nevertheless, their imbalances never reached the same proportion as those in the Baltics and Balkans. Overall, their economies are in stronger positions to weather any contagion. Slovakia successfully entered the Eurozone earlier this year, while Poland qualified for a US$ 20.5 billion flexible credit line (FCL) from the IMF. An FCL is a precautionary facility, available only to countries with very strong fundamentals, which can be drawn upon at any time and without meeting any specific conditions. Such a facility should help provide Poland with a bulwark against contagion.

Walaupun IMF bersedia membantu negara-negara seperti Polandia, saya tidak tahu apakah dana IMF bisa digunakan di saat yang diperlukan.

Akhirnya, ada yang tertarik melakukan short Eropa Timur?


Singapore, 15 Juni 2009.

Disclaimer: Ekonomi (dan investasi) bukan sains dan tidak pernah dibuktikan secara eksperimen; tulisan ini dimaksudkan sebagai hiburan dan bukan sebagai anjuran berinvestasi oleh sebab itu penulis tidak bertanggung jawab atas segala kerugian yang diakibatkan karena mengikuti informasi dari tulisan ini. Akan tetapi jika anda beruntung karena penggunaan informasi di tulisan ini, EOWI dengan suka hati kalau anda mentraktir EOWI makan-makan.